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The recent stream of literature of systemic risk in financial markets emphasized the key
importance of considering the complex interconnections among financial institutions. Much
efforts has been put to model the contagion dynamics of financial shocks, and to assess the
resilience of specific financial markets—either using real data, reconstruction techniques or
simple toy networks. Here we address the more general problem of how the shock propagation
dynamics depends on the topological details of the underlying network. To this end, we
consider different network topologies, all consistent with balance sheets information obtained
from real data on financial institutions. In particular, we consider networks with varying
density and mesoscale structures, and vary as well the details of the shock propagation
dynamics. We show that the systemic risk properties of a financial network are extremely
sensitive to its network features. Our results can thus aid in the design of regulatory policies
to improve the robustness of financial markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
The several crises that happened in the last two decades lead scientists and regulators to rethink
the approach used to assess market risk with a systemic perspective [1–7]. A common denomi-
nator that emerged from these work is the importance of considering the structure of financial
dependencies [8–12], a thing that pushed the research in the direction of designing novel systemic
risk mechanisms [13]—from the seminal approaches of Eisenberg & Noe [14] and Furfine [15] to
the recently introduced DebtRank centrality [16]. These methods are nowadays implemented in
stress tests performed by central banks [17], and the current scientific challenge is thus no longer
to quantify the systemic risk but to suggesting specific regulatory solutions to change the structure
of the system in order to diminish risk. To this end, it is essential to understand which features of
a financial network make it more or less resilient to systemic risk In this work we focus precisely
on this challenge.
One of the first works in this direction is that of Gai & Kapadia [2], where it was shown that
random Poisson networks are “robust-yet-fragile”: and the probability of contagion is maximal
for intermediate network density, whereas systemic losses monotonically increase with the network
connectivity. Mastromatteo et al. [18] further show that, under the Furfine dynamics, sparse
Poisson networks in general lead to more defaults that very dense networks. Roukny et al. [19]
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2showed that no single topology always leads to the lowest risk (in particular, scale-free networks
can be both more robust and more fragile than homogeneous Poisson architectures). Leon &
Berndsen [20] argue that modular scale-free architectures favor robustness, whereas, Montagna &
Lux [21] show that the dependence of systemic risk on the density changes if shocks are correlated.
Bardoscia et al. [22] show that, under the DebtRank dynamics, the system’s stability decreases
with the density due to the presence of cycles.
In this work we aim to set an exploration of the network sensitivity of systemic risk which
encompasses these previous findings, and extends them by considering modular, core-periphery
and bipartite network structures.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Data
To build financial (interbank) networks, we use the Bankscope dataset [23] containing the
balance sheet of the 100 largest European banks. In particular, we have information about the
interbank assets Ai, the interbank liabilities Li and the equities Ei of each i of these banks, and
we consider data for years 2008 and 2013 (i.e, before and after the global financial crisis) [24]. We
recall that the equity of a bank is the difference between its positive positions and its obligations
to creditors. When the equity is positive the bank is solvent, otherwise it goes bankrupt (defaults)
because it would not be able to refund its debts. Since the chosen group of banks is not an isolated
systems, interbank assets and liabilities do not sum up to the same value; in order to have a closed
system, we rescale them to have
∑
j Aj =
∑
j Lj .
B. Network Generation
In the literature on financial networks, interbank markets are typically reconstructed from
balance sheet data—before being tested for systemic risk [25]. Here we use and generalize the
approach of Cimini et al. [26] to generate (rather than reconstruct) financial networks compatible
with balance sheet information. The method is based on a combination of Exponential Random
Graphs [27, 28] and the fitness model [29] (see further details in [26, 30].
First, we generate an unweighted directed graph by drawing each edge i → j independently
with probability:
pi→j =
zAiLj
1 + zAiLj
, (1)
where z ∈ (0,∞) is a parameter controlling for the density of the network. Indeed, since the
values of assets and liabilities are given, this probability is an increasing function of z, hence the
link density of the network is proportional to the parameter z. We consider also the possibility
of having self-loops in the graph because some of the top European banks may represent banking
group with internal flow of money. The alternative possibility would be to use the RAS algorithm
to get rid of self loops [31].
We then assign a weight to each link, in accordance with the generated graph adjacency matrix
ai→j , as follow:
wi→j =
AiLj
Wpi→j
ai→j (2)
3where W =
√
(
∑
iAi)
(∑
j Lj
)
. The final result is a weighted directed network given by the cor-
responding adjacency matrix A whose entries are Aij = wi→j . In the economic network literature
this matrix is referred to as the asset matrix while its transpose is called the liability matrix.
The distribution of assets and liabilities across banks is heterogeneous, and with such an input
our network construction method generates a core-periphery, independently on the network density.
In order to get rid of this constraint, we introduce a generalization of Eq. 1.
pi→j =
z (AiLj)
φ
1 + z (AiLj)
φ
, φ ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
The new parameter φ allows to model a wide range of network topologies (for fixed z), including the
fitness-induced configuration model and the Erdos-Renyi random graphs as the two limits (φ = 1
and φ = 0, respectively).
C. Block Structure
The network generation method allows one to explore different network structures. Thus one
can further decompose the adjacency matrix A into blocks. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we shall
restrict our consideration to the case in which there are only four blocks present in A as following
A =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
Each block Anm, n,m = 1, 2 represents a subgraph of the network in which the link density is
characterized by znm, n,m = 1, 2. Furthermore, among all possible topological configurations,
there are three distinct ones that we shall focus on, namely the modular, the core-periphery and
the bipartite-like structures.
a) The modular topology
In this case the network is clustered into two groups of nodes with dense connections within the
groups and sparse connections between them. The configuration corresponds to the choice of z11
and z22 such that they are both much larger than z12 and z21. In the implementation, this can be
achieved in a following manner: without loss of generality, put z12 = z21, z11 = z22 = z and then
generating the blocks A11 and A22 with z and those A12 and A21 with λz, where λ ∈ [0, 1].
b) The bipartite-like topology
As an opposing configuration of the modular structure, one can consider the case in which the
interconnections between the two communities dominate over the connections inside each commu-
nity. The parameterization now is given by z12 = z21 = z and z11 = z22 = βz, where β ∈ [0, 1].
c) The core-periphery topology
Of special interest in the investigation of financial networks is the case in which a core-periphery
relationship between two groups of banks is observed. This situation results in a higher link
density in the first group while it is lower in the second one. As mentioned in the last section, the
network generated by Eq. (1) inherently possesses the core-periphery structure. Therefore, any
parameterization of the form z12 = z21 = γz, z22 = γ
2z and z11 = z, where γ ∈ [0, 1], would show
only small differences between the two extreme γ = 0 and γ = 1. This is why we need to use the
Eq. (3) to generate the core-periphery topology.
4D. DebtRank
Once the network is constructed, we use the DebtRank to model the propagation of shocks in a
network of banks [32, 33]. We consider the relative loss of equity hi(t) for bank i and the interbank
leverage matrix Λij(t):
hi(t) =
Ei(0)− Ei(t)
Ei(0)
(4)
Λij(t) =

Aij(0)
Ei(0)
if bank j has not defaulted up to time (t− 1)
0 otherwise
(5)
The dynamical equation for the relative equity hi(t) reads:
hi(t+ 1) = min
1, hi(t) + N∑
j=1
Λij(t)[p
D
j (t+ 1)− pDj (t)]
 (6)
where pDj (t) = hj(t)e
α[hj(t)−1] is the probability of default of bank j at time t, and α ∈ (0,∞) is a
controlling parameter which allows to switch continuously from the linear DebtRank (α = 0) [32]
to the Furfine algorithm (α→∞) [15].
We define the average equity loss as the quantity:
Eloss =
∑
i
[hi(t)− hi(1)]Ei(0)∑
iEi(0)
(7)
where Ei(0) is the initial equity of the bank i, and hi(1) is the initial shock on equity for i.
We use two kind of stopping criteria during the simulation: when the difference cond = ‖(h(t)−
h(t− 1))E(0)‖2 becomes smaller than a tolerance tol, or when the number of interactions is equal
to maxiter. The value of the parameters tol and maxiter depends on the studied cases.
III. RESULTS
We reconstruct the interbank network for year 2008 and 2013. We then run the stress test
according to DebtRank shock propagation mechanism on the reconstructed network. Finally, we
measure the Eloss of all banks. We do this over different network density ρ. For each ρ, we sample
10 networks and calculate the average Eloss over these networks. In term of initial shock, we do
the uniform shock by reducing the equity value of each bank by θ of its initial equity. Figure 1
shows the result of this exercise for ρ ranges from 0 to 1, and θ ranges from 0 to 0 to 0.6.
First, we see from the figure that the Eloss increases as the ρ increases. This implies that the
network becomes more fragile when it becomes more dense. Second, we find a significant Eloss
value for the small θ in the 2008 data. However, we see that Eloss decreases as the ρ gets larger.
This implies that there is a critical value of θ where the sufficiently small shock propagates to the
entire network and causes almost all the banks to default. From the figure, we see that the critical
value is around 0.1 for the 2008 data. Finally, by comparing the 2008 data and the 2013 data,
we find that the Eloss for every combination of ρ and θ has changed significantly from before the
2008 crisis to after the crisis. The figure shows that the network of the 2013 data is more robust
compare to the network of the 2008 data.
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FIG. 1: Eloss as a function of the link density and the magnitude of the uniform shock for the 2008 (left) and
the 2013 data (right). Darker (brighter) color refers to the higher (smaller) DebtRank, which corresponds
to a more fragile (resilient) financial network.
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FIG. 2: Eloss as a function of the link density for a fixed value of initial shock, θ = 0.4 uniform shock
in the 2008 case (left) and the 2013 data (right). Different curves correspond to different magnitudes of
non-linearity in the relation between DebtRank and average equity loss.
Previously, we have looked at the case of the DebtRank. This is the case where α = 0 in the
Equation 7. Here we do the similar exercise, but we look at for different value of α. In particular,
we are interested in the case DebtRank, Furfine, and the non-linear model in between. To this
end, we look at the value of α = 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,∞. Figure 2 shows the results for this exercise.
First, we look at the case for the networ of 2008 data. Here we find that, in respect to ρ, the
Eloss increases and converges towards a possible highest value of Eloss. In constrast, we see a
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FIG. 3: E
∗
loss as a function of the parameter φ tuning core-periphery structure in the 2008 interbank network
case for ρ = 0.06 (left) and ρ = 0.21 (right). Full lines correspond to a uniform shock protocol.
different behavior of Eloss for the large α. We also find a completely different behavior of Eloss
for the case of α = 0.5. Here we find that it shows a similar behavior to the case of large α in the
regime of small ρ, but instead it shows a similar behavior to the case of small α in the regime of
large ρ.
The behavior we describe above is not seen for the case of 2013 data. Here we find instead that
Eloss for different α never converge towards similar value.
Up to this point, we have looked at the case of φ = 1 where we use the fitness configuration
model to reconstruct the interbank network. Here we look at the case of other value of φ. In
principle, we are interested to look at the effect of different topological properties on the value
Eloss value. To do this, we do the similar exercise as above, but we tune the parameter φ this time.
Figure 3 shows the result from this exercise.
First, we see from the figure that the E
∗
loss increases as the φ increases. This means that the
network with core-periphery structure shows more fragile behavior towards the shock. By looking
at the figure for the case of ρ = 0.06 and ρ = 0.21, we see that this behavior is consistent for both
density. Additionally, we also find that as the density increases, the difference of E
∗
loss for each φ
also increases.
To look at the E
∗
loss in other topological properties, here we do the above exercise but for the
communities topology network. We shock the first community, and measure the E
∗
loss of the second
community. Finally, we look at the bipartite topological structure. Figure ?? shows the result for
these exercises. Here we see that as the initial shock increases, the network becomes more fragile,
for both the communities topological structure and the bipartite topological structure.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have examined different topological properties and shown how they affect the systemic risk.
In addition, we also used variety of shock types and changed the way they propagated across the
network. The results prove how complex the interbank system is and how many variables are
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FIG. 4: E
∗
loss as a function of the parameter θ in the 2008 interbank network case for the communities
topological structure (left) and the bipartite topological structure (right). The ρ = 0.1 is used.
involved in shaping its resilience.
For the simplest situation of Eq. (3) when φ = 1, and it reduces to Eq. (1), there is a qualitative
difference between the behavior observed in 2008 and 2013. As shown in figure 1, the crisis shaped
the interbank market in a way that it is much more robust to small shocks even in the high density
regime. But the change of systemic properties of the system is more significant. To describe it,
we will need to look at the figure 2. Different values of the parameter α can be seen as different
approaches of the market participants towards loses in their counterparts equity. The higher the
α, the higher the confidence in the counterpart ability to recover from loses. In 2008 we observed
two significant regimes of the propagation, depending on the network density and the parameter
α. If the confidence in the system was not high enough, at some given density, the system jumped
to a contagion state, equal to the one observed for α = 0. On the other hand, in 2013, even for
low confidence, increasing the density did not resulted in an asymptotic value equal to the one
observed in the no-trust case.
Above results are interesting from the perspective of crisis impact but they also imply that
different structure of balance sheet changes the way the system reacts to various topological prop-
erties. We would like to explore this direction in the future work by repeating the simulations for
different synthetic balance sheet structures.
It should also be pointed out that across different α we observed increasing risk as a function
of density. This was, however, obtained with uniform shock in all equities. As shown in [18], if
we consider defaulting single bank, we expect increasing density to help the system withstand the
shock, at least for α = 1.
The method of network reconstruction described by Eq. (1) imposes, as a result of fat tail distri-
bution of assets and liabilities, a core-periphery structure. As a consequence, the only topological
parameter used before, was the network density. By introducing parameter φ in Eq. (3) we were
able to continuously change the network structure from a random one (φ = 0) to a core-periphery
one (φ = 1). As shown in figure 3 the core periphery structure is less resilient, even in the case
of point default. It confirms the well known fact that strongly connected nodes increase the shock
8propagation. Interestingly, even a shock imposed on the periphery nodes on average propagates
faster in the core-periphery structure, compared to homogeneous degree case. This result is similar
in both 2008 and 2013, the only difference being the curve slope, which is lower in 2013, confirming
the increased post-crisis stability.
In the last step of our analysis we looked at a block structure of a network. In the case of
community structure, this can be seen as a study of shock propagation between two connected
markets, which may represent different countries. On the other hand, the bipartite case is a
simple approximation of a bow-tie structure, which is often observed among financial networks. In
both cases we were interested to see how does a shock on one side propagates to the other. The
results are presented in the figure ref[]. For communities we can see that the impact has a square-
root dependence on the initial shock size. Moreover, in accordance to the intuition, this effect is
weaker with decreasing connectivity between the communities. When we move to bipartite the
dependence is similar, however it is decreasing when we move further from the bipartite structure.
For a constant density, this is an effect of the increasing probability of a connection between two
big institutions from different groups.
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